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ABSTRACT
Websites with hyper-partisan, left or right-leaning focus offer content that is typically biased towards
the expectations of their target audience. Such content often polarizes users, who are repeatedly
primed to specific (extreme) content, usually reflecting hard party lines on political and socio-
economic topics. Though this polarization has been extensively studied with respect to content, it is
still unknown how it associates with the online tracking experienced by browsing users, especially
when they exhibit certain demographic characteristics. For example, it is unclear how such websites
enable the ad-ecosystem to track users based on their gender or age. In this paper, we take a first
step to shed light and measure such potential differences in tracking imposed on users when visiting
specific party-line’s websites. For this, we design and deploy a methodology to systematically probe
such websites and measure differences in user tracking. This methodology allows us to create user
personas with specific attributes like gender and age and automate their browsing behavior in a
consistent and repeatable manner. Thus, we systematically study how personas are being tracked by
these websites and their third parties, especially if they exhibit particular demographic properties.
Overall, we test 9 personas on 556 hyper-partisan websites and find that right-leaning websites tend
to track users more intensely than left-leaning, depending on user demographics, using both cookies
and cookie synchronization methods and leading to more costly delivered ads.
Keywords Online hyper-partisanship · User tracking · Online Personas · User discrimination · Advertisments
1 Introduction
In the era of mass Web monitoring, users are being tracked and their behavioral data collected and used, typically for
ad-targeting purposes. Recent research has explored the impact of ad-tracking on user privacy [1, 2], and showed the
scale and sophistication of the ad-ecosystem, and ad-pricing used during the real-time bidding protocol (RTB) [3] or
header bidding protocol [4] to serve ad-slots to webpages. In fact, a deeper examination of the ad-ecosystem reveals
a set of complex techniques such as synchronization of cookies across websites [2, 5, 6] and fingerprinting of user
devices [7, 8], in order to perfect the user profiles being targeted. Indeed, a highly precise profile allows ad-platforms to
effectively match ads with target audiences. However, the side effect of these highly sophisticated profiling techniques
is a massive breach of user’s privacy. Without any consent, a profiled user is unknowingly disclosing her interests and
(dis)likes to the benefit of ad-platforms.
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Recently, such user profiling techniques have also been used for targeted opinion shaping such as Cambridge Ana-
lytica’s U.S. presidential campaigns for Donald Trump [9] and Ted Cruz [10], UK-based campaigns for the Brexit
referendum [11], and Russia’s social media operations during the 2016 U.S. presidential election [12]. All these
campaigns have one common motif: use of fake and partisan disinformation campaigns. In fact, a slew of websites
hosting such content have emerged since the start of Trump’s campaign [13]. These pages allow fake and partisan news
to be shared unchecked on the social media, garnering ever increasing partisan audiences. Some examples are Infowars,
Breitbart and Fox News, for the right, and Occupy Democrats, Bipartisan Report and MSNBC for the left.
At such a juncture, we are compelled to ask: Do these fake and Hyper-partisan news websites (HPWs) – which have
been shown to have highly selective audiences – exhibit any particular differential behavior when it comes to tracking
their online visitors? i.e., are websites on the left (right), differentially tracking the left (right)-leaning visitors more
than the right (left) leaning ones?
To answer this multi-faceted question, we first establish a methodology for understanding how HPWs and their
embedded third parties track different user demographics. We create 9 carefully crafted personas representing different
genders and age groups. We load browsers with these personas and visit a list of 556 verified HPWs [13], to observe
differences in the way these personas are being tracked via different types of cookies placed by HPWs and the third
party ad-ecosystem.
We search for large-scale patterns by co-clustering both the personas and websites visited, using non-negative matrix
factorization [14, 15, 16]. We examine the extent to which the ad-ecosystem performs unbalanced tracking and cookie
synchronization [6, 2] on users of particular demographics, when a persona visits the right- or left-leaning HPWs.
Finally, we intercept and analyze RTB-based ads placed when visiting HPWs with particular personas, and establish
differences between tracking practices on right and left HPWs, as well as differences in the monetary value of placed
ads.
With this study, we make the following main contributions:
1. We design the first to our knowledge methodology to detect possible unbalanced tracking performed from
HPWs and their collaborating third parties of users that belong to different demographics.
2. We extend an existing crawling tool with our methodology, and open source our framework1 in order to
enable fellow researchers, policy makers or even end-users to audit websites on how they personalize tracking
technology based on the visitor’s web profile.
3. Our results show that in HPWs, advertisers set the majority of cookies on users’ browsers. These advertisers
are among the top in the overall ad-ecosystem, and are over-represented on HPWs compared to their presence
on the general web. In fact, some of the top trackers are twice as prevalent on HPWs as on the general web.
Also, having an established persona from a particular demographic (with cookies obtained from visiting
stereotypical websites for users of that demographic) results in up to 15% more cookies stored than for a
baseline with no set persona. Furthermore, popular or highly-ranked HPWs track users more intensely than
lower-ranked websites. More importantly, our results show that right-leaning websites, in general, track users
with up to 25% more cookies than left-leaning websites. They also enable more data sharing with advertisers
and trackers by facilitating up to 50% more cookie synchronizations between these third parties, than in
left-leaning websites. This intense tracking leads up to 5x higher cost ads than left-leaning websites. We
discuss implications of our work for online users’ privacy.
2 Overview of Methodology
2.1 Third party tracking on the Web
Websites nowadays consist of several components that may originate from many different domains other than the one
the user visited. These components provide functionality like widgets, analytics, targeted ads, and recommendations. In
order to provide as much personalized content as possible, these third parties keep track of user’s personal information
(e.g., geolocation, browsing device, gender) and preferences (e.g., purchases, searches, etc.) locally in a cookie placed
in the user’s browser, and in their servers’ database using the same cookie ID.
Although several policies (e.g., Intelligent Tracking Prevention [17] and Same Origin Policy [18]) have been proposed to
mitigate the privacy intrusion from such pervasive tracking, there are several sophisticated techniques that allow trackers
to bypass such mechanism (e.g., Cookie Synchronization [2, 19], Web Beacons [20], Cross-Device Tracking [21], etc.)
and re-identify a user across different websites and create detailed profiles about her preferences and interests (e.g.,
1Data and code available from https://tiny.cc/partisan-tracking/
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Figure 1: Crawling methodology and framework for measuring tracking of different personas by hyper-partisan websites
visited, and third parties embedded in them.
Table 1: Terms and notations used in our methodology.
Terms Notations
General persona Pj , where P0 is baseline (i.e., does not have any profile or user history loaded)
Simple persona P1≤j≤4 are 1-feature personas
Rich persona P5≤j≤8 are 2-feature, “rich history” personas
Hyper-partisan websites (Left) WLi are left-leaning websites; 1 ≤ i ≤ 164
Hyper-partisan websites (Right) WRi are right-leaning websites; 165 ≤ i ≤ 556
Tracking Domains (Left) DLi are domains in all left-leaning websites; 1 ≤ i ≤ 164
Tracking Domains (Right) DRi are domains in all right-leaning websites; 165 ≤ i ≤ 556
Crawl (SQLite Database) CPjn represents crawl database file for persona Pj , 0 ≤ j ≤ 8 and 1 ≤ n ≤ {5, 15}
runs of the same setup depending if it is a simple persona or a rich persona.
sexual preferences, political beliefs, etc.) [22]. Then, this data can be sold to anyone interested [23], or handed over to
agencies [24].
2.2 Overview of Crawling Methodology
A general illustration of our methodology and implemented framework is shown in Figure 1. To obtain consistent user
behavior that allows repeatable and systematic web measurements, the proposed framework leverages a methodology
with carefully curated user personas that have a history built on Web traffic that could be expected from users of specific
demographic groups. Using each of these defined personas, we then visit HPW, which have been carefully categorized
(manually) as left- or right-leaning by domain experts (journalists and fact checkers at Buzzfeed News [25, 26]). Then,
we log and monitor first and third party (e.g., ad-ecosystem) tracking performed during these visits, for later analysis
and comparison between personas and baseline or null users. We summarize various terms used in the paper in Table 1.
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Figure 2: Numbers of distinct third parties observed after visiting a set of top alexa.com websites for building persona
per category (man, woman, young, senior).
2.3 Incremental Persona Building
Our goal is to visit different websites with the “persona” of a user from a particular demographic group, based on
age or gender. We build personas by visiting top Alexa ranking websites for different demographics. The intuition
is that the third party ecosystem that enables tracking and personalized targeting [27, 28, 29] builds up a persona or
profile of a user based on the type of websites they visit. Thus, by visiting websites which are highly popular in a
particular demographic, we establish a persona of that demographic. Previous works have inferred that there are certain
demographic and geographical features which are highly associated with a person’s partisan lean [13], including age,
gender and location (whether from a right- or left-leaning US state). Therefore, we build our personas based on these
characteristics, focusing on age and gender, and training from different locations in the USA.
We use alexa.com which gives the list of websites that are most popular with different demographics2, as captured in
October 2018. However, an important question is: How many of the websites should be visited, before a user profile
becomes “stable”? To check this, we visit the top websites in each category in a random order3, and count the number
of distinct third party cookies obtained after each new visit. Figure 2 shows the number of third party cookies for
personas with different demographics, after visiting the top websites for each category. We observe a large increase in
the number of cookies when the first 2–3 websites are visited, and then the increase in absolute numbers of distinct
cookies tapers off. Following the average number of 30 cookies found per website in a study of 1 million Alexa-ranked
websites [30], we say that a persona has “matured” once it has reached ≥ 50 unique third party cookies. We observe
that visiting 6–7 websites is sufficient for a persona to mature, except in the case of Youth, which does not receive more
than 100 cookies (possibly due to laws such as COPPA [31] which safeguard against collecting personal information on
very young users) even after visiting 20 websites. However, even in the case of the Youth demographic, we observe that
the first 2–3 website visits already expose the user to the majority of distinct third party cookies, and by the time 6–7
websites are visited, well over 50% of the eventual total number of cookies have been collected.
Therefore, we conservatively assume a persona with a specific demographic being “stable” or “established” by visiting
the top 10 websites associated with users of that demographic, and storing the third party cookies obtained. Also,
visiting the same websites from different locations produced similar numbers of cookies. When visiting other websites
(e.g., the HPWs in §2.5), we mimic a specific demographic by loading cookies obtained for that user group. Similar
numbers of websites have been used in other studies to establish a profile of cookies. For example, in [32] they used the
top 10 websites of each of 16 categories for analyzing ad content.
2Under https://www.alexa.com/topsites/category
3We have verified that the actual order of visit does not affect the results
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Table 2: Examples of websites from each category of alexa.com
for creating personas with specific demographics.
Demographic Sample websites
Youth (Y) (Student, Kidzworld).com, Voicesofyouth.org
Senior (S) Aarp.org, (Medicare, Cms).gov
Woman (W) (Cosmopolitan, Womansday, Sheknows).com
Man (M) (Menshealth, Mensjournal, Esquire).com
Note that we also use compound personas with more than one demographic characteristic (e.g., young man, or senior
woman). To establish compound personas, we visit and store cookies from the top 10 websites from each demographic
(e.g., 10 of the top websites for seniors and 10 for women collectively establish the “Senior Woman” persona), in a
random order. We encode each persona with the initial letter of the feature incorporated in the persona. For example
‘SW’ signifies a persona representing Senior-Women. Similarly a YM persona represents the persona of a Young-Man.
The personas used are listed in Table 2.
We visit all websites in a persona-specific list as a stateful crawl that stores the user history in a browser. After the visits
are finished, we dump the browser state accumulated as an archive file per persona. This persona state corresponds to
stored cookies, HTTP calls done, location, etc. Each archived file can then be used to bootstrap a browser with the
said persona, ensuring our measurements per persona for each visit of a HPW are bootstrapped with the same browser
persona state. Next, we discuss more details on automation and browser settings of the crawling approach.
2.4 Crawling Engine of Framework
We make use of OpenWPM[33], a popular tool for measurements and automating web browsers, which is developed by
Princeton University under the Web Transparency & Accountability Project [30]. Using OpenWPM, we create user
personas and bootstrap parallel sessions of Firefox browsers to visit HPWs with each persona. In order to be able to
compare browsing experience of a persona with a baseline, we load null personas (i.e., a user with no website visit
history) to the browser and re-execute the website auditing. Also, using the same tool, we collect cookies set both
by javascript calls (i.e., transactional cookies) and HTTP calls (regular cookies set in the browser, logged as Profile
cookies). Transactional cookies include all logs of cookies set in the browser, including the deleted instances of cookies.
In our analysis, we consider both types and refer to them as Cookies.
We kept most of the default settings of OpenWPM’s browser instance and updated a few for our use. The default settings
include loading a Firefox browser (only this is supported by the tool), having always enabled third party (tp_cookie)
tracking, keeping blockers like donottrack, disconnect and ghostery, https-everywhere, adblock-plus, ublock-origin
and tracking protection as false, so that nothing is blocked. The updates include enabling the http_instrument which
logs HTTP responses, requests and redirects, using the selenium headless browser to perform crawling and, setting
js_instrument, cookie_instrument and save_javascript to true to store javascript cookies table, regular (profile) cookies
table and all javascript snippets loaded and executed by website respectively.
A HPW crawl with a loaded persona is stateless, i.e., each HPW website visit is independent. We repeated each HPW
crawl 5 times per persona and 2 times per baseline, to account for infrequent, but unavoidable network errors. In later
sections, we label a persona visiting a left- or right- HPW, using ‘L’ and ‘R’ respectively, and append this with the
persona’s acronym. For example, ‘L:Y’ is for a Youth persona visiting left HPWs; similarly ‘R:SM’ is for a Senior-Man
persona visiting right HPWs.
Since each browser instance is independent, multiple browser instances can be initiated on a crawling server (depending
on its available resources). This parallelization allows for multiple, simultaneous crawls of personas and baselines,
scaling our auditing to many websites at the same time from one location. This also allows us to capture the same
tracking and advertising effort from third parties, before ad-campaign budgets change.
Our crawls were executed in Nov-Dec 2018. Our crawling engine was set up on 10 Amazon Web Services (AWS)
instances (each: 1 GB memory, 1 core, 8 GB storage, Ubuntu 14.04) in the USA, for instantiating parallel crawls. The
crawling was orchestrated by OpenWPM, loading a Firefox 52.0 browser instance and visit websites using Selenium.
Each AWS instance uses a parallel and independent OpenWPM instance loaded with a different persona profile. Each
crawl gives us ∼500MB SQLlite database across the 10 instances. This database stores information about the HTTP
calls, cookies, visit sequence, and other meta information based on the settings described earlier.
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Table 3: Crawls for persona building (P:) and visits to HPWs (HPW:). Second column: total count of requests or
responses across crawls; Third column: average count per website; Fourth: standard deviation (SD) per website; Fifth:
median count per website.
Response Type Total Count Mean per website SD per website Median per website
P: HTTP Requests 53.2k 190 186 135
P: HTTP Responses 49.6k 177 155 132
P: HTTP Redirects 7k 25 46 9
P: Cookies 36.8k 131 192 67
HPW: HTTP Requests 8.3 M 159 194 98
HPW: HTTP Responses 8.1 M 144 181 93
HPW: HTTP Redirects 2.5 M 65 149 40
HPW: Cookies 3.5 M 60 132 16
2.5 Datasets Collected
We implemented our methodology into the framework illustrated in Figure 1 for user tracking on 667 HPWs. Each
website is marked as left- or right-leaning (WL and WR, respectively) based on the description and self attestation
from the website’s ‘about’ page, or facebook page description. Interestingly, out of 667 websites curated in 2016, 111
websites were not active in Nov-Dec 2018 when the crawls took place. Thus, in our study we use 556 active websites:
164 left- and 392 right-leaning HPWs. We normalize our results to account for the imbalance between the two lists.
We visit HPWs using baseline (null) and persona profiles. We store the cookies served to each persona profile or new
user and analyze their distributions, type of first or third party sending them, popularity of the HPW involved, etc. A
summary of our dataset regarding HTTP calls and cookies set during persona building and final crawls for all personas
and HPWs is given in Table 3. The results on baseline profiles and personas are analyzed in the next two sections,
respectively.
3 Basic User Tracking in HPWs
Our modus operandi is to use the previous methodology with our deployed framework to visit various HPW, and
examine differences in the tracking performed by the first and third parties included in each. In this section, we focus on
null profiles to measure basic tracking performed on new (null) users. We conduct an investigation on the differences in
tracking, by comparing left and right HPWs (Sec. 3.1), by looking into the top trackers on the Web and whether they
are over/under represented in left and right HPWs (Sec. 3.2), and finally, by studying popularity of HPWs and checking
if this associates with differences in tracking (Sec. 3.3).
3.1 Who facilitates more tracking: left or right?
The volume of cookies in a website is a good proxy for measuring how much the website tracks a user directly, and how
much it enables third parties in its page to track this user. To understand how much of this tracking is happening on
HPWs, in Figure 3, we plot the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of number of cookies set on a baseline user’s
profile when visiting WL and WR. On average, WR set 9 more cookies than WL on baseline users.
Next, we study the type of cookies set on baseline users, using a list of Disconnect.me [34]. In Figure 4, we breakdown
the cookies into six types: first-party, advertising, analytics, content, social, and other. Third party cookies from
advertising entities significantly outnumber all other types. Furthermore, WR place more cookies of all types, and
especially for advertising, in comparison to WL.
3.2 Is this tracking more than the general Web?
Earlier, we showed that HPWs enable tracking of users by third parties, and that WR do so in higher intensity than WL.
But who are the top trackers in these partisan websites? And how different is the tracking they do, when a baseline
user visits such HPWs? We extract the top trackers on the Web using a live list maintained by whotracks.me [35]
on 25/09/19, and compare this list against the trackers detected in the two groups of websites, when they are visited
by a baseline user. We find that 72% of third parties match between the list and the ones on HPWs. However, there
are also differences among the HPW tracking ecosystem and the Web with respect to intensity in tracking from each
party. Figure 5 shows a histogram of percentage of websites that specific trackers appear in, and drop cookies on their
users. Many of these top trackers are over-represented in the HPWs examined, in comparison to the Web. For example,
6
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Figure 3: CDF of total number of cookies stored per website, when a baseline user visits left and right-leaning HPWs.
Figure 4: Average number of cookies per website, per type of domain sending them (using the Disconnect.me
categories).
Doubleclick, Scorecardresearch, Quantserve, and Adnxs, appear in at least twice as many websites (proportionally)
than in the general Web. Furthermore, many of them appear in many more websites on the right (WR) than the left
(WL), demonstrating an interest in tracking users visiting right-leaning HPWs.
3.3 Is tracking associated with site popularity?
We observed differences between WR and WL in number of cookies they drop on users, type of third parties involved,
and top trackers in the Web that also appear in these websites. Next, we investigate how the tracking intensity of HPWs
associates with the popularity of each HPW. In Figure 6, we present the cookie counts of HPWs dropped on baseline
users, against the respective rank range of each website based on Alexa. Again, we find that regardless of the rank range,
WR serve more cookies than WL. Interestingly, the top ranked WR (i.e., 1-10K) demonstrate the highest median
count, with that count decreasing for lower ranks.
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Figure 5: Percentage of websites with cookies set (x-axis) from top 16 tracking domains on the Web (y-axis), for left and
right-leaning HPWs, as well as in the Web, for a baseline user. Domain ranking based on live list of whotracks.me.
In the next section, we compute various measures to provide statistical evidence of differences in personas and their
demographics vs. intensity of tracking facilitated by Hyper-partisan websites.
4 User Persona Tracking in HPWs
The central question of this study is whether online personas exhibiting specific partisan browsing patterns are targeted in
a differentiated fashion by the ads and analytics ecosystem. We use our deployed framework to investigate this question.
Using the built personas, we first examine the overlap between third parties for distinct personas across partisan aisles.
This helps us ascertain whether our framework’s personas are being treated as valid by the tracking ecosystem (Sec. 4.1).
Then, we measure statistical differences between third parties across personas and popularity of domains (Sec. 4.2).
We also use a matrix-based clustering technique to investigate whether trackers behave preferentially across partisan
lines (Sec. 4.3). Then, we investigate the information flows between trackers, by measuring cookie synchronizations
happening across webpage visits (Sec. 4.4). Finally, we evaluate whether the ad-ecosystem differentiates between our
partisan personas in terms of the ad-pricing offered across different HPWs (Sec. 4.5).
4.1 Third Parties in User Personas and HPWs
To produce systematic results regarding tracking of personas, we first need to validate whether our personas are being
tracked by the HPWs ad-ecosystem. Validating this step imparts confidence on our results. To that end, we select the
personas of youth, seniors, women and men, and separately visit left and right leaning HPWs, to check the overlap
of common third parties across HPWs and personas. For this, we measure the total number of common third parties
in personas and left or right HPWs. As seen in Figure 7a, all comparisons yield upwards of 25% overlap in domains
of third party cookies. This signifies that our personas can be actively tracked by trackers that also exist in left and
right-leaning HPWs.
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Figure 6: Cookies count for baseline users visiting WR and WL, vs. the alexa.com global ranking of these websites
captured on 25/02/19. Top rank WR have highest median of cookie count and the median decreases as the rank
increases. Websites with no ranking have very few cookies.
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Figure 7: (a) Overlap between third parties dropping cookies during persona building, and when the same personas visit
HPWs. (b) Heat-map of KS statistic test for all pairwise comparisons between distributions of numbers of unique third
parties serving cookies. All cells with p ≥ 0.01 are whited out; only cells with p < 0.01 are colored. (c) Percentage
difference between third parties serving cookies to baseline and loaded personas. The x-axis is sorted on medians of all
personas.
4.2 Which demographic is tracked more?
Next, we compare the number of third party cookies from different domains stored for different personas (Figure 7b).
Again, we see that WR have many more third parties embedded in their pages. They also have higher number of cookies
than WL, perhaps expectedly given the larger number of third parties. This result points to a tendency from WR to
monitor more intensely users across the Web with tracking technologies, with the purpose of (re)targeted advertising.
Although fewer third parties are interested in WL, the top ones that are involved have a higher coverage than the
left HPWs covered. As example, most of the top third parties such as Google and Adobe have similar coverage
of both WL and WR. However, providers such as Pubmatic and Adsupply have a higher coverage of and special-
ization in WL or WR, respectively. In cookies count, we also find extreme cases from WR (e.g., spectator.org,
realclearpolitics.com) andWL (e.g., newshounds.us, opednews.com) which set more than a thousand cookies.
Next, in Figure 7c, we compare the difference in numbers of third parties and cookies, when comparing a baseline
persona with one of the curated personas. A few personas, such as Youth Man (YM), seem to experience a slight fall
in number of cookies relative to baseline. However, most others see an increase in the number of third parties setting
cookies. From Figure 7c, we see that, in general, single-feature personas such as Woman, Man and Youth see the highest
increase in number of cookies placed, regardless of political leaning of the website. Comparing this with Figure 2,
9
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Figure 8: Variation in cookies count for foxnews.com (top ranked WR) and msnbc.com (top ranked WL) with various
personas. In both websites, the cookie count is lowest for the baseline persona. X-axis is sorted by increasing count of
cookies on both sides.
(a) B Factor (b) C Factor
Figure 9: Bt and Ct factors from NMF clustering of At for six categories and 3 clusters (i.e., k = 3). We show the
scale of all the figures in top-right corner, which is normalized from 0 to 1.
where Youth hardly gets ∼50 cookies even after visiting 10 websites, this increase in tracking over baseline suggests
unusual behavior on HPWs. From the same figure, for WL, we see the highest increase in tracking is for Youth and for
WR the highest tracking increase is for Woman.
As a special case, we also study two popular websites: MSNBC (WL) and Fox News (WR). Figure 8 shows the cookies
placed by these two websites on visitors with different personas. These examples highlight that there is a bias in the
way partisan news websites change their tracking behaviors, depending on the demographic of the user visiting them.
Also note that Fox News (∈WR) serves more cookies than MSNBC (∈WL) for all personas.
4.3 Hyper-partisan Clustering
We test our framework on self declared left or right leaning websites [13]. Hence, we hypothesize that the trackers
being deployed on these HPWs would converge onto preferentially tracking personas conducive to the prime audiences
10
Stop tracking me Bro! Differential Tracking of User Demographics on Hyper-Partisan WebsitesA PREPRINT
of these websites. For example, a tracker deployed on a right leaning website would prefer deploying the tracking
cookies on a right leaning persona as opposed to a left leaning persona.
To test this hypothesis, we use Non-Negative Matrix Factorization (NMF) [14] to cluster the websites, as well as the
targeted demographics into the most viable clusters. The members of these clusters exhibit more similar behaviors to
each other, compared to members outside these clusters.
NMF decomposes any non square matrix A into two components such that A ≈ B × C, where B is called the factor
basis matrix with the dimensions p × k , and C is called the coefficient matrix with dimensions k × c, for any choice of
k clusters. For a given choice of k, the NMF algorithm tries to solve the optimization problem:
min||A−BC||2F , such that B ≥ 0 and C ≥ 0 (1)
where F represents the Frobenius norm. To setup this optimization problem, we first need to compose the matrix A,
such that it reflects the cookie profile observed by any given persona. We create a p × c dimensional matrix, which we
call A, where p represents the rows corresponding to all the personas we curate, and c represents the columns which
correspond to the different third party. We normalize each row, such that Aij now represents the percentage of cookies
injected for a user of the Pi persona by the jth domain.
As described in Section 3.1, we have distinct set of cookies for each persona viz. first-party, advertising, analytics,
content, social and others. Hence, we create 6 distinct matrices corresponding to the 6 different types of cookies. We
further factorize each of these ‘persona cookie profile’ matrices At, into corresponding basis Bt and coefficient Ct
matrices where t ∈ (1, 6) using NMF.
According to [36, 37], clusters should be chosen to have high cophenetic correlation and small residuals. After
experimenting with various values of k(∈ [2, 10]), we find that the best clustering is obtained when k = 3, giving us the
maximum cophentic correlation (0.982) and minimum residual value (9).
(a) Cookie synchronization (b) Distribution of Prices (c) KS statistic of Prices
Figure 10: (a) Cookie synchronizations per HPWs for the different personas. For the vast majority of personas, the
persona visiting WR receives more cookie synchronizations than the one visiting WL. (b) Distribution of prices in
CPM paid by advertisers to deliver ads to personas. The median price for WL is $0.561 CPM, and the median price for
WR is $0.667 CPM. Considering the top 25% most expensive ads, WR got (up to 5×) higher ad-prices than WL. (c)
Heat-map with the KS statistic of 2-sample KS test for all pairwise comparisons between distributions of paid prices
per persona, and visited WL and WR. All cells with p ≥ 0.01 are whited out; only cells with p < 0.01 are colored.
The results of this clustering have two implications. First, the well-defined clusters for k = 3 validate our hypothesis
that the trackers deployed on HPWs preferentially converge onto specific partisan personas. Second, it allows us to
further pinpoint how left- and right-leaning personas are associated with different kinds of third parties, ranging from
advertising to analytics. The value of k = 3 also matches the intuition that two of the three clusters could be assigned
to the left and right partisan positions, respectively. The third cluster can be interpreted as the middle ground (if any)
between party lines. This can be seen in Figure 9. Figure 9a (first party) shows that our profiles clearly fall into either
the Left or Right cluster. Figure 9b (first party) shows only the top 10 websites for clarity (rather than all HPWs). Here
again, we can see websites fall into either the left or right category. After we computed the NMF on the different
matrices At, we get the various Bt and Ct factors in Figure 9, for advertising, analytics, etc. Figure 9a shows that ‘first
party’ and ‘other’ domains essentially take clearly the extreme far clusters, as they have in cookies set from WL and
WR (Figure 9b). Personas exposed to WL are easier to cluster for advertising, analytics and content, whereas social is
less clear. Furthermore, from the Ct factors in Figure 9b, we see that some first party domains are clearly clustered
in the left (e.g., The Nation) and others as right (e.g., Fox News). Also, for analytics and advertising, many domains
are heavy on the right-wing cluster. For content, many domains including google, microsoft and adobe appear to be
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clustered on the left-wing cluster, apart from oberon4. Interestingly, for social, Facebook and reddit are clustered in the
right-wing cluster.
4.4 User information flows and Cookie Synchronization between trackers
So far, we studied individual cookies set for each user (persona) in our methodology, and their potential impact on
tracking of the said user. In this section, we set out to explore the possible discrepancies in the flows of the user
information among the different tracking and advertising entities. The scope of these information flows is not only to
share directly information about the current user, but more importantly to synchronize the different aliases by which
a user may be known to different entities, building this way a common identifier. This identifier will later allow the
server-to-server exchange of user data in the background [6], or data purchase in user data markets [38, 39]. This alias
synchronization is the point where all user data collected by different third party trackers get attributed to a very single
rich user profile.
The most common alias (or user ID) used on the web for user identification is the cookie ID, set on the user side the
first time a domain meets the said user. However, cookies are domain-specific. So according to the same-origin policy,
a domain cannot see the cookies set by another domain. To bypass this and join together the different sets of user
IDs, trackers and advertisers invented the Cookie Synchronization (CS) technique, which they use in order to pass
information from one to the other tagged with the ID of the user, thereby merging their databases in the background.
CS is performed when a third party D1, embedded in website W , redirects or issues a new HTTP request to a different
collaborating third party D2, while piggybacking in the request the cookie ID userD1 it has set for the given user. This
way, D2 learns that the user just visited W (information obtained from the referrer field) and is also known on the web
as user D1. After that, D2 can drop its own cookie on the user side or sync a previously set cookie. It is apparent that
the more CS appear in a website, the more third parties can learn about the user.
To explore if there are any discrepancies in this ID synching and merging for the different categories of personas, we
leverage existing CS detection methodologies [6, 2]. We apply these detection methodologies in our dataset, and in
Figure 10a, we plot for each crawl the detected CS per HPW for the different personas. Although the ratio of CS per
website varies per persona, for the vast majority of personas, the websites in WR not only set more cookies (as shown
in Figure 3) but also perform more CSs than WL. By facilitating more CSs, WR enable more third party trackers to
access and track the browsing behavior of the users than WL. This leads to more intense personalization and targeting
of ads, which can be measured by the prices paid by advertisers for said ads. We explore this in the next paragraphs.
4.5 Which user costs more to advertisers?
Digital advertising is where user tracking and collected user data get translated to money. Users get targeted with ads
that match their interests, as extracted from the collected user data. As a next step, we set out to explore the monetary
cost advertisers pay for the different personas, with the dimension of hyper-partisanship. To achieve this, we leverage the
most prevalent mechanism of digital ad-buying and delivery nowadays, i.e., the real-time programmatic ad-auctions [28].
Under these setting, available ad-slots in a publisher’s website can be auctioned as soon as the website is rendered in the
user’s display. This Vickrey type [40] of auction takes place at real time in ad-markets called ad-exchanges (ADX) and
special bidding engines called Demand-Side Platforms (DSPs). These DSPs represent ad-agencies that place bids per
auctioned ad-slot. In order for the DSPs to decide if and how much they will bid for an ad-slot, detailed information
is needed regarding the interests, geolocation, gender, age, sexual or political preferences, etc., of the current user
viewing the webpage. Such information is being bought from trackers and data warehouses on the background in an
asynchronous fashion. To reduce latency, along with the bid, DSPs also send the ad-impression they want to deliver to
the users if their bid wins the auction.
In order to assess the winning bid and thus the price paid for the ad-slots each user receives, we leverage the most
dominant ad-auction protocol nowadays: the RTB protocol [41]. Specifically, we capture the step where the user’s
browser (as instructed by the ADX) issues a HTTP request to the winning bidder notifying them about: (i) its win,
(ii) the charge price, and (iii) the successful rendering of the ad-impression. Following the methodology of previous
works [3, 5], we estimate the monetary values the ad-ecosystem paid for the different category of personas in our
dataset.
In Figure 10b, we present the distributions of the ad-prices for WL and WR. As we can observe, the median price for
WL is $0.561 CPM (CPM=Cost Per Mille, i.e., cost per thousand impressions), and the median price for WR is $0.667
CPM. However, when it comes to the top quartile of the more expensive ads, WR get (up to 5×) higher prices than the
corresponding ones of WL.
4oberon-media.com is a multi-platform firm that gives gaming solutions
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Finally, to explore the variability of prices across different personas, in Figure 10c, we plot a heat-map with the statistics
of 2-sample KS tests of all pairwise comparisons between the paid ad-prices per persona, for WL and WR. We not
only see a particular variability among the different types of HPWs as demonstrated in Figure 10b, but we also see that
there are personas with significantly higher ad-prices than others for the same type of websites.
4.6 Summary
In general, our results indicate that right-leaning HPWs have more third parties embedded in their pages, they monitor
and track users with more cookies, these third parties synchronize their cookies more often or with more intensity, and
all this tracking activity leads to better ad-targeting, and thus higher paid prices for delivered ads. We summarize our
findings as follows:
1. Right-leaning HPWs news have embedded significantly more third parties and store up to 25% more cookies
to user browsers than left-leaning HPWs.
2. User personas exhibiting realistic and representative demographic characteristics tend to receive up to 15%
more tracking (cookies) from HPWs than baseline personas (i.e., with no characteristics).
3. Popular, highly-ranked HPWs track users more intensely than lower-ranked HPWs.
4. Single-feature personas, e.g., Woman, Man, Youth, are highly tracked by default, no matter what party-leaning
they demonstrate through their visits.
5. It is possible to group personas to left or right-leaning clusters, based on the domains and numbers of cookies
they receive while browsing HPWs.
6. Right-leaning HPWs aid third parties to track more intensely their users than left-leaning HPWs, by facilitating
up to 50% more cookie synchronizations between trackers than left-leaning HPWs.
7. Right-leaning HPWs deliver to users ads costing up to 5x more than in left-leaning HPWs, as a consequence
of more intense tracking and ad-targeting performed.
5 Related Work
Politics and Polarization. Political parties involve user audience often through polarization, as well as by urging them
to volunteer and campaign for the party [29]. With most of the political discussion happening in the cyber-space, user
experience leads the way of engagement and enchantment [42, 43]. For example, news personalization is a way to send
curated news briefing to subscribers [44, 45]. [46] coined dark money which is spent on negative ads. Another selective
political initiative is the highly polarized HPWs in US politics, studied by [13]. HPWs declare themselves right- or
left-leaning in their web portals. Interestingly, many of these HPWs were deleted after US 2016 elections. However,
more than 550 still exist and we focus our study on them. Alternate (or fake) news websites can also be highly engaging.
URL sharing of alternate news across the Web was studied in [47]. Studies have tried to understand the political stance
of users and news websites by various methods. Examples include the use of NMF clustering (k = 2) [15], finding
non-binary political ideological scores, sentiment analysis [48], twitter profile data [49], etc.
User Tracking and Information flow. Many studies have analyzed the extent of online user tracking. In [50], authors
measure the trackers per website and find that, on average, there are 10 different trackers per website; in news websites
this average is 15 trackers. Similarly, in [30], authors used Alexa top 500 websites for each of the 16 basic content
categories of Alexa. They find that websites providing editorial content embed the largest amount of trackers given their
lack of external funding sources, and their need to monetize page views through advertising.
A popular web tracking mechanism is the use of cookies set on the user-side. In [51], researchers measured differences
in third party cookies offloaded on a browser by collecting data from real users over a period of 1 year, before and
after the GDPR regulation [52], and found that the number of cookies does not change, not least because users tend to
pay little attention to the GDPR options. In [5], researchers were the first to analyze the technique of synchronizing
different user IDs that various entities set for the same user, thus reducing the user’s anonymity on the Web. They also
study Cookie Synchronization (CS) in conjunction with the ad-delivery paradigm of RTB auctions. In [1], researchers
measure the costs of digital advertising and use CS as a metric for the reduction of user’s privacy. Also, [2] conducted a
thorough analysis of CS by analyzing a year-long dataset of real mobile users and showed that CS increases the number
of domains that track a user’s browsing by a factor of 6.75. In [53] authors show that CS can break users’ secure SSL
sessions and increase their identifiability on the Web, even if they browse over VPN. They probed 12,000 top Alexa
websites and found that 1 out of 13 websites expose their visitors to this severe privacy leak. In [6], authors study
CS together with re-spawning cookies and investigate how these two can form persistent cookies that users cannot
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abolish even after clearing their cookie jar. In [54], authors simulate users browsing the web in an attempt to study the
possibility of a passive eavesdropper leveraging third party HTTP tracking cookies for mass monitoring. They find that
indeed the eavesdropper can reconstruct 62-73% of a typical user’s browsing history.
Biases in Online Ecosystem. In an attempt to shed light over today’s opaque online ad-ecosystem, [32] proposed
Sunlight: a system to detect targeting in large-scale experiments with statistically justifiable results. Their system
consists of four components that generate, refine, and validate hypotheses to reveal the possible causes of observed
targeting. Similarly, [19] developed a content-agnostic methodology to detect client- and server-side flows of information
between ad-exchanges by leveraging retargeted ads. In [55], user browsing history is studied to define audience gender
and age demographics. An SVM model is trained on the text in websites, to predict user features and bias in advertising.
Evidences of bias in ad-placement is given by [56]. Using a tool named AdFisher, the authors investigate ad-placement
with adjustment of Google ads settings of user. Thus, setting gender to female resulted in fewer ads related to high
paying jobs. In [57], authors studied 5 million paid ads on Facebook and claim that US users are mostly targeted by
foreign groups using loopholes in regulations of Facebook.
6 Discussion and Future Work
Understanding the dissemination of misinformation over online platforms and fringe news sources (e.g., Breitbart or
Infowars) has become a crucial topic of study because of its considerable impact on our online culture. These sources
are often found responsible for spreading news and opinion pieces with extreme views along partisan lines. This strategy
keeps users engaged with the websites for prolonged periods of time. A major incentive of such Hyper-partisan websites
(HPWs) to follow this strategy is monetization by delivering targeted and personalized ad-content to profiled users.
In fact, these websites do not need to provide any credible content or news, thus, reducing costs for journalists and
other expenses, otherwise incurred on legitimate news websites. However, until now, it remained unclear how such
HPWs perform targeted advertising and whether they differentiate their online user tracking based on demographics
and partisan leaning of their audience.
To shed light to this problem, in this paper, we present a methodology that creates artificial users (personas) with
certain demographic features. We find that a stateful browsing of a small number of 10 websites is sufficient to build
a persona (cookie state) of hundreds of unique third parties. We store browser states of personas and use them to
emulate diverse types of browsing patterns along partisan lines, and in the process, record how these websites track
them. The data acquired from such persona-based crawls are an asset for investigating user experience, bias in tracking,
and various other privacy metrics. By visiting 556 HPWs, we collected and analyzed a dataset of ∼19 million HTTP
(requests, responses and redirects) calls and ∼3.5 million cookies. In general, we find a higher amount of tracking
in the right-leaning HPWs, and also an increased tracking for personas exhibiting specific patterns with respect to a
combination of gender and age demographics.
Among the right-leaning HPWs, the top ranked (by Alexa) websites are consistently loaded with more trackers, in
comparison to less popular HPWs. By performing a co-clustering on the personas using the NMF model, we observe
that we can group personas and third parties in a low dimensional space using the types of cookie domains as features.
We obtain three optimal clusters which can be labelled as (mild) left, (mild) right and neutral. Finally, investigating
the third party cookie synchronization (CS) and examining the prices paid for ads as declared in the real-time bidding
protocol, we conclude that right-leaning HPWs apply more intense CS and command higher prices for delivered ads.
For the benefit of reproducibility, we reported an in-depth process for the creation and deployment of said personas.
This approach is easily scalable across different demographic features and browsing patterns. Our framework can also
be repurposed for auditing other ecosystems such as e-commerce, web search engines, public social media pages, and
other recommendation services. Our framework can be useful for enforcing new regulations under data protection (e.g.,
GDPR [52]) which have been introduced to give back control of personal data to their owners, and increase overall Web
transparency. As GDPR enforcement is in its initial phase, most of the control on user’s data and tracking still remains
with the websites, allowing many HPWs to take liberties on how to comply with regulations. For example, in our study,
we found cases of right-leaning HPWs (e.g., spectator.org) and left-leaning HPWs (e.g., newshounds.us) setting
more than 1000 cookies per user.
Indeed, there are some limitations of our framework, which we plan to overcome in the near future. For example, data
protection laws do not allow cross-border tracking, which results in logging 33% fewer trackers when the crawling is
performed from websites under EU’s jurisdiction, as compared to traffic logged within US. Another area to explore is
the variability in tracking of personas, and its relation with the ad-economies and end-user experience. For example, if a
website is visited on two consecutive days, tracking metrics will most likely be different. Also, there is a wide-range of
different, less or more pronounced and compound personas that someone can emulate with our framework. Clearly,
every persona comes with costs of finding appropriate websites to build it, and additional experiments to make sure it
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triggers network traffic realistic for an online user of that persona. In fact, less pronounced personas may not be able to
collect appropriate and conclusive data of differential tracking. In the future, we aim to build better tools to understand
these problems. We also plan to further develop our framework to look into the ad-ecosystem on fringe news websites,
and replicate our work for multiple countries to discover user differential tracking and personal data leaks.
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